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Abstract. The article examines the marginal political practices of young 
people as a way of communicating with the authorities. Such characteristics 
of political practices of young people as virulence, diversification, non-normality 
and hybridity have been revealed. Based on the analysis of political cases of recent 
years, the most popular marginal political practices, meme practices, the battle 
of sticker packs, hashtags, etc. have been identified. The main research method 
was trend watching. In the course of the study, the value-semantic grounds for 
the application of marginal political practices by young people and their legal 
regulation by the state were identified. The analysis showed that the popular-
ity of marginal political practices as a way of communication between young 
people and the authorities lies in the imperfection of the organisation of power 
in the Russian Federation. As a result, possible steps were identified that gov-
ernment institutions and individual officials can take to construct a productive 
dialogue with young people. In the conclusion, the results of the study are sum-
marised, including the unpredictability of the outcomes of the use of marginal 
practices, their excessive legalisation and social partnership as the most effective 
way of their constructivisation.
Keywords: marginal political practices, communication, political trends, 
trend watching, social partnership
1. Introduction
One of the factors of the formation, development and functioning 
of society and social systems is the communicative process, through which 
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intergenerational interaction and the transfer of traditions, culture and 
experience are carried out and organisation of communication and joint 
activities is provided. In addition, communication acts as a social mechanism 
for the emergence and implementation of power in the society.
The term ‘communication’ appeared in scientific literature at the begin-
ning of the 20th century and is understood as a means of communication 
of any objects of the material and spiritual world; as communication, trans-
fer of information from person to person (interpersonal communication); 
as communication and exchange of information in the society (social com-
munication) [Shibutani, 1999].
Traditionally, three forms of implementation of communication in the so-
ciety are considered:
1. Communication as a dialogue of equal partners. In this case, there 
is an exchange of information, interaction taking into account the interests 
and positions of each.
2. Management as a purposeful influence of the communicator on the re-
cipient of information. It is about the desire to change the motivation, values, 
goals and aspirations of the communication partner in the process of com-
munication and to endow information with certain meanings.
3. Imitation as borrowing patterns of behaviour, communication styles, 
lifestyle of some members of the society by others. Thus, for example, a trans-
fer of traditions, language, knowledge and skills from generation to gener-
ation takes place.
Depending on the goals pursued, the following communication functions 
in the political sphere can be distinguished:
1. Information and communication —  a process of exchange of infor-
mation, emotions, opinions and feelings occurs. In terms of communication 
between young people and the authorities, it can be used to inform about 
each other’s positions, about the vision of the essence of a particular political 
event, and can be used as a feedback channel.
2. Interactive —  it is characterized by the interaction of individuals 
in the process of interpersonal communication. It allows you to negotiate and 
make compromise decisions, create a lively social and political interaction, 
correct decisions made and react to their consequences.
3. Epistemological —  it creates space for adequate transmission and 
perception of information, taking into account the ability of the parties 
to correctly interpret information; promotes recognition and knowledge 
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of each other. Often, politicians misinterpret the messages of socially and 
politically active youth, since they speak in different categories.
4. Axiological —  conditions for the exchange of spiritual values and for 
the formation of a single value space are created in the process of commu-
nication.
5. Regulatory —  communication is a means of transferring and consol-
idating norms in everyday consciousness. Situations of double standards 
often demonstrated by officials can be regarded by young people as a variant 
of the norm, or contribute to the formation of destructive political practices.
6. Socio-practical —  in the course of communication, the results of activ-
ities, abilities, skills are exchanged, the possession of competencies is demon-
strated. In the process of the constructive political communication, includ-
ing through forums, charitable and volunteer actions, young people and 
politicians can exchange positive experiences, be heard, and get real results 
of their activities.
Defining social communication Shilova considers it as a process that 
connects separate parts of social systems with each other; it is a mechanism 
through which power is realised (power as an attempt to determine the be-
haviour of another person) [Shilova, 2004]. Thus, political practices can be 
viewed as a means of communication between politically active youth and 
the government / state.
The political sphere is one of the spheres of self-realization of youth. 
The unstable political situation in the country and the world worries more 
than a quarter of young people (26.5 %) and every fourth (21.1 %) is con-
cerned about the imperfection of the state [Chueva, 2017]. In addition, 
one in four young people (24.1 %) considers the situation with corruption 
in the country, as a characteristic of domestic political life, the most worri-
some at the moment. Youth political movements and public organisations 
have been created and are functioning in Russia and political associations 
provide channels of social mobility for young people. At the same time, they 
do not feel themselves to be active participants in political life, an actor and 
a subject capable of influencing decisions made in public and political life. 
Thus, a study of the values of young people showed that a third of young 
people aged 16 to 24 is more likely to approve of the values of the modern 
Russian state, but 28.2 % do not approve. At the same time, in the event of un-
favourable unforeseen social upheavals, every fifth young person (21.3 %) 
expressed readiness to take part in protest actions.
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Participation in political rallies is one of the forms of political activity 
of young people which is gradually beginning to develop in modern Russia. 
According to the results of a study of the value orientations of Russian youth 
[Chueva, 2017], more than half (52.4 %) of the surveyed young people aged 
16 to 24 did not participate in political rallies and are categorically against 
such actions. Only 4 % of respondents often take part in political rallies, 
and 8 % indicated that they tried to participate or rarely participate. A quar-
ter of young people surveyed, not participating in political rallies, do not 
blame others for such participation. Since young people aged 16 to 24 are 
in the stage of forming a worldview, it is very important for state and public 
organisations and political leaders to take measures to create mechanisms for 
their constructive participation in the country’s political life and to prevent 
destructive manifestations during mass political events.
P. Bourdieu [Burd’yo, 1993] spoke about the dualism of the political 
sphere where on one side there is the political sphere characterised by insti-
tutionalisation, approved and supported by the state, but on the other side, 
the marginal political sphere, that is, extra-institutional, extra-systemic and 
extra-ideological [Vafin, 2011]. The dualism of the political sphere is increas-
ing, and the line of demarcation becomes more and more illusory as a result 
of the shift of politics to the digital sphere.
According to a study of the value orientations of Russian youth [Chueva, 
2017], young people show a moderate interest in politics —  half of the re-
spondents indicated that they are interested in politics from time to time 
(48.9 %), and every third is not interested in politics at all. Thus, the majority 
of young people aged 16–24 are rather apolitical. Despite this, almost 17 % 
of the respondents closely follow the political life in Russia and in the world, 
and less than 4 % take an active part in political activities. The shift of politics 
to the digital space increases the participation of young people (aged 18–30) 
in it, since digitalisation is one of the main characteristics of modern youth, 
which means that the emergence and development of its political activity 
takes place precisely in the social media space.
The growth of civic engagement and political participation of young people 
is expressed primarily in the digital and not only political practices they use.
The political practices of youth have the following characteristics:
1. Virulence: the political mood of young people as a reaction to loud, 
significant or resonant events spreads extremely quickly across the Web 
becoming similar to a media virus;
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2. Diversification: the repertoire of digital political practices of young 
people is constantly expanding creating the danger of their non-linear and 
unpredictable spread;
3. Hybridity: digital political practices of youth are carried out on the bor-
der of the street and social media;
4. Non-normativeness and fronting: digital political practices of young 
people cannot be unequivocally defined as constructive or destructive; 
at the moment, their research is between knowledge and ignorance, which 
makes it difficult to predict and regulate youth political participation.
Based on the characteristics identified, it can be concluded that the digital 
political practices of young people are marginal. But, if traditionally sociolo-
gists (G. Simmel [Zimmel], P. Bourdieu etc.) consider marginality as a bor-
derline state, when a subject being outside moves to the border of something 
systemic and non-marginal, then we [Blinova, 2019; Kruzhkova, 2019] in our 
study understand the phenomenon of marginality from the standpoint 
of political anthropology focusing not on its constructive or destructive na-
ture, but on its content. In this regard, marginality, in relation to the digital 
political practices of youth, is understood by us as a form of non-institutional 
interaction in the digital space, the result of which is the reproduction and 
transfiguration of political relations by young people, the acquisition of civic 
identity and the realization of civic subjectivity. Marginal political practices 
of young people in the digital space are becoming a new norm in the era 
of post-politics, post-democracy and post-ideology turning from a rare case 
into a communication trend.
2. Study material, methodology and research technique
The material of the study was publications in social networks, forums, 
blogs and vlogs representing significant political events for Russia —  the 
‘SQUARE conflict’ in Ekaterinburg in May 2019, elections to the Moscow City 
Duma in August 2019, the introduction of restrictive measures in the context 
of the COVID-19 pandemic, protests in Khabarovsk, voting on amendments 
to the Constitution, protests in the Republic of Belarus.
Trend watching, as the main research procedure, made it possible to es-
tablish that the marginal nature of the political practices of young people and, 
above all, the uncertainty of normative assessments reveal contradictions 
in legal regulation in this area.
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3. Research results and the discussion of the results
As a result of the analysis of individual cases, we have identified the fol-
lowing marginal political practices of young people:
1. Petition practices on the resources of Change.org and ROI used to at-
tract more participants in the action.
2. Hashtags used to identify themselves and their position in a political 
conflict, and the ‘hashtag war’. For example, #YazaSkver, #YazaKhram or 
#Ihavetherighttochoose, #liveBelarus, #YaMyBatka etc.
3. Battle of sticker packs, i. e. using stickers in messengers to express their 
position. For example, Telegram Channel users have access to sets of stick-
ers reflecting both the position of the authorities in the conflict in Belarus 
(‘Defend the Old Man!’) and protest ideas (‘Father, resign!’).
4. Flash mobs performing a mobilisation function, for example, the or-
ganisation of walks, meetings, etc., serving to indicate the seriousness of their 
intentions and their visualisation to government institutions.
5. Cyberbullying, trolling, holivar implemented through bullying, threats 
spreading across the Network, including also physical violence against partic-
ipants in the actions, as a rule, either opponents or representatives of the state.
6. Memo Practices —  creation and replication of political memes as a re-
action to what is happening and the representation of their subjective position 
in the conflict. For example, the image of the location of temples in the cen-
tre of Ekaterinburg in the form of a symbol of Baphomet —  an inverted 
pentagram, a paraphrase of the famous saying ‘There is no choice, but you 
cheer up!’, the meeting of A. Lukashenko and V. Putin in Sochi in a cos-
play of a meme about two dogs of the Siba Inu breed —  sickly Chims and 
pumped-up Doge.
7. Streams, posts and reposts on online news platforms and social net-
works, i. e. conducting online broadcasts from places where the main events 
take place, or a chronotope of events in real time distributing photos and 
positions of LOMs in their accounts.
8. The practice of creating and distributing fake news. This practice 
is used either to draw more attention to the conflict or to escalate it.
9. Digital remote rallies, including Yandex rallies. As an example, oppos-
ing the procedure for issuing passes, the lack of guarantees for the preserva-
tion of wages and jobs, complaining about financial difficulties in the context 
of a pandemic and the introduced ‘self-isolation regime’, residents of Moscow, 
St. Petersburg, Ekaterinburg, Rostov-on-Don, Krasnoyarsk, Nizhny Novgorod 
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and other cities used the ‘Conversations’ function in the mobile version of 
‘Yandex.Maps’ and ‘Yandex.Navigator’ which allows you to put a point on 
the map (for example, near the building of the regional government) and 
write a protest commentary on it (‘Finish with this! No money, no work! 
What to live on?’, ‘Feed my cats, and I will stay at home!’ ‘Either an emergency, 
or pay the loans and utility bills yourselves!’, ‘You can’t even run alone’ etc.).
Digital political practices of young people appearing in the Internet 
space, spreading within it and uniting like-minded people cannot fully 
realize themselves and achieve their goals while remaining on the Internet, 
for this they need to go beyond its limits into the offline space. Here they are 
reduced, as a rule, to the practice of protest behaviour. Protest behaviour can be 
considered as behaviour characterised by the dissatisfaction of a social group 
with the current state of affairs, unjustified expectations and at the same 
time a willingness to take concrete actions to change a subjectively perceived 
negative situation [Gaba, 2015]. In other words, protest for young people 
is a way of self-presentation, on the one hand, and a way of verbalising and 
accentuating their position, on the other.
The choice of protest by young people as the main political practice 
is not accidental, but it is conditioned by internal and external factors, name-
ly, the social status of this social group, as well as the position occupied 
by the authorities in political conflicts. As for internal factors, they follow 
from the characteristics of young people as a social group. Young people are 
characterized by a lack of political knowledge and excessive emotionality, 
which together give a sharp and unpredictable reaction to what is happening. 
The marginality of political practices allows various unscrupulous power or 
opposition groups to manipulate the political activity of young people and, 
speculating on the desire of young people to change the situation in the coun-
try for the better, to direct it in accordance with their own selfish goals. An-
other characteristic of youth is dynamism and perspective. Since a young age 
is a period of acquiring civic identity, the formation of civic subjectivity and 
the formation of a social and political position, young people act as drivers 
of state development, striving to modernise the existing political structure 
through vigorous activity.
Therefore, the socio-political guidelines chosen by them determine 
the future development of the country and society. Besides, the practice 
of protest behaviour is close to young people due to their non-conformity and 
inclination to take unjustified risks in defending their interests and fighting 
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for justice. Ignoring the demands of young people on the part of the author-
ities, or the use of punitive measures, can lead to riots and violent confron-
tation between youth and the authorities, as it happened in the SQUARE 
conflict and the conflict over the elections to the Moscow Duma. Finally, 
the social inequality felt by young people relative to other social groups also 
gives rise to protest in order to define their view of the situation and force 
other people to hear and see them. The social inequality is expressed in their 
borderline position between childhood and adulthood, in connection with 
which the representatives of the authorities prefer to either not notice nor 
hear them, nor not give their speeches serious significance. For example, 
at the fifth Eastern Economic Forum (EEF) held in Vladivostok on Septem-
ber 4–6, 2019, President of the Russian Federation V. V. Putin advised young 
people not to waste energy on protests, but to direct it to increasing the birth 
rate. It can be assumed that the President, as the highest official in the state, 
voiced the position of the official authorities regarding the expression of their 
political position through their protest behaviour. At the same time, it may 
be sensible (without reference to young people) to engage in a controversy 
with the authorities on this issue. It should be noted that protest for po-
litically active youth is a democratic way to declare a position and invite 
the authorities to a constructive dialogue, and not an idle pastime. The au-
thorities must remember that, on the one hand, young people are, according 
to K. Mannheim [Manhejm, 2010], a hidden resource of society on which 
its vital activity depends, but on the other hand, according to G. Marcuse 
[Markuze, 2003], they are a new revolutionary force, and therefore, a refusal 
for a dialogue and replacing it with populist speeches or ‘festival’ meetings, 
can lead to tragic consequences.
The authorities are not able to overcome internal factors since they are 
generated by the internal specifics of young people and their attitude to social 
and political problems; yet by their behaviour, by competently building in-
teraction with young people, the authorities and officials can minimize these 
problems, ceasing to perceive young people as an insignificant socio-political 
force whose aspirations and demands are not essential and do not deserve 
to be heard and resolved.
S. Huntington [Hantington, 2018] said that people’s demands grow faster 
than the government’s ability to fulfil them. Nevertheless, the authorities 
must necessarily have the function of strategic thinking and forecasting 
in order to understand that young people are not an idle bored mass, but 
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a resource of citizenship for the sake of which and thanks to which the state 
will develop in the future.
‘The picture of the future formed by today’s youth also determines what 
Russia will be like in 10 to 20 years. Through children and youth, the country 
reproduces itself, and it will depend on what values the young generation will 
accept today’, said Pyotr Tolstykh* on youth policy in Russia at an expanded 
parliamentary hearing in the State Duma back in 2017.
As for external factors, they should include, firstly, a sense of the fal-
sity of the events taking place and a sense of violated social justice that 
arise among young people, and not only among them. Unpopular reforms, 
humanitarian actions carried out by the state, and positioned as a benefit 
for the country and the people, undermine the credibility of the authori-
ties. ‘… Those values and ideas that seem convincing, lofty and fascinating 
to the country’s leadership are simply alien and therefore do not arouse any 
interest in the milieu upon which they are trying to impose, and primar-
ily among urban youth’ [Krasheninnikov, 2017]. A sense of injustice also 
arises due to the adoption of ambiguous laws (for example, the one which 
enters into force from 1 November 2019, namely, No. 90-FZ of 1.05.2019 
On Amendments to Federal Law No. 126-FZ’ On Communications’ and 
Federal Law No. 149 -FZ On Information, Information Technology and 
Information Protection —  the law on the sovereign Internet) and their 
ambiguous interpretation and application. Every seventh young person 
is worried about restrictions and control by the state (15.2 %). For example, 
Maria Motuznaya was accused for her reposting on social networks, her case 
being subject to Article 282 of the Criminal Code of the Russian Federation; 
and administrative proceedings were brought up against Lev Gammer for 
violation of No. 30 —  FZ On Amendments to Federal Law No. 149-FZ On In-
formation, Information Technologies and Protection of Information (Law on 
Insult to the authorities). But none of the officials who permitted themselves 
to insult society and its citizens, also protected by No. 30-FZ, were punished.
Secondly, a factor in the protest behaviour of young people is the nega-
tive moral and ethical image of the authorities broadcasting their disrespect, 
inability, and in some cases, unwillingness to talk to young people about 




to give birth,’ ‘no money, you need to eat less,’ ‘you don’t like the prices, then 
you earn little,’ ‘while you pay on the mortgage, you can take your children 
to the orphanage’ are very clear examples.
Statements of politicians, their behaviour during high-profile and 
‘significant for young people’ actions (the  policy of  non-intervention 
of A. Vysokinsky, the mayor of Ekaterinburg, in the conflict over the con-
struction of the temple which led to its escalation, or the forceful measures 
taken by the authorities of Moscow during protest events) and the tendency 
to avoid solving problems but protecting themselves from young people 
marginalise the authorities themselves, making them objects of memes and 
various types of bullying and thus undermining their credibility. It can be 
assumed that the ideas of young people about the corruption in the country 
and state structures intensify the fear of not realizing themselves in life.
The control of external factors is completely in the hands of the authori-
ties. The health of a society depends on the quality of power. A firm, account-
able and decisive government with a socially significant goal has a positive 
effect on society. On the contrary, the vacillating, incompetent, self-serving 
government which has made quick enrichment a fetish negatively affects 
the stability of society and undermines the confidence of the masses in the su-
preme institutions [Safronov, 2006]. What can be proposed to the authorities 
to undertake so as to rationalize the youth practice of protest behaviour and 
make it constructive?
First, the authorities need to stop being afraid of young people, stop 
ignoring them and recognise their right to civic subjectivity and political 
activity. They should recognise that youth is human capital that will ensure 
the development of Russia in the future, and for this it is necessary to know 
and accept the values in accordance with which modern young people live, 
and not to reproach them with the notorious traditional values of a country 
that has passed away and is alien to them, and not to oppose the values 
of today’s youth with state violence because this practice is short-lived and 
will turn against the authorities and the state.
Secondly, the authorities need to abandon the punitive policy towards 
politically active youth. Today, the government considers all manifestations 
of political activity of young people through a legal prism qualifying this or 
that marginal practice in accordance with the articles of the Criminal Code 
of the Russian Federation or the Code of Administrative Offenses of the Rus-
sian Federation. If the corresponding article is not found, it is immediately 
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issued; so it was with the adoption of the so-called Law on the Protection 
of Power and with amendments to Art. 13.15 of the Administrative Code on 
punishment for spreading fake news. At the same time, the authorities prefer 
not to notice that such legislative activity not only does not solve the prob-
lem of marginal political behaviour of young people, but also endangers 
the democratic foundations of the state and aggravates the conflict situation 
forcing young people to engage in more and more marginal practices. Due 
to the flexibility and creativity of thinking, young people will find new ways 
to protest against inaction or injustice of government regulation. As a re-
sult, instead of organising joint productive work, the authorities are driving 
themselves and the youth into a bad infinity of confrontation.
The third step can be social partnership, i. e. interaction based on the de-
sire of the parties to reach agreement [Shchenina, 2011]. Social partnership 
is based on cooperation between the authorities and youth as equal subjects 
of the political process. Realization of social partnership can be achieved 
by involving young people in the process of their concerns. In Russia, such 
a direction of political power as youth policy is developing, there are a large 
number of youth organisations, like the youth parliament, Rosmolode-
zh, and the Young Guard, etc. Nevertheless, there is no need to talk about 
the effectiveness of youth policy. The reason for this is the lack of clear goals 
for the activities of youth policy bodies and of the criteria for assessing 
the effectiveness of these activities. There is no clear algorithm for involv-
ing youth organisations in socio-political activities. There is no normative 
legal act governing the functioning of youth organisations in the Russian 
Federation (today there is only the Strategy for the Development of Youth 
of the Russian Federation for the Period up to 2025). Exercising control over 
the activities of youth political organisations, government institutions deter-
mine the directions of this activity and its quality, which reduces the effect 
of the institutionalized political activity of young people to naught pushing 
them to use marginal practices. There are no effective youth leaders who 
can articulate the interests and needs of youth. In other words, we can talk 
about the absence of a system of youth policy in Russia, and accordingly, 
the authorities solve the problems of youth on a situational basis.
The fourth step in overcoming the protest behaviour of youth as the most 
popular marginal political practice is a constructive dialogue between the au-
thorities and youth characterised by a high level of interest of the parties 
in reaching agreement. A dialogue in the political sphere is a reasonable 
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alternative to violence, war, terrorism, revolutions, uprisings, riots and other 
manifestations of political extremism, radicalism, impatience and intoler-
ance. At the same time, dialogue in politics does not mean a conversation 
between two or more persons on political issues, but a certain configuration 
of interaction, a negotiation process and partnership based on the principles 
of discursive equality between the subjects of political communication striv-
ing for mutual understanding and achieving a mutually beneficial result and 
taking into account a wide range of existing opinions and interests [Zajcev, 
2013]. Today the political dialogue is difficult for the following reasons. First, 
is mutual distrust. The authorities do not trust young people since they are 
an unstable social group capable of destabilizing the socio-political situation. 
Young people do not trust the authorities since the authorities have run out 
of the confidence vote and are not perceived by young people as an institution 
capable of rational management for the benefit of society. Secondly, the weak 
level of civil society development. Despite the fact that Russia is positioned 
as standing by the democratic rule of law, real democracy, civil society and 
the rule of law are not its integral characteristics. A specific feature of civ-
il society is its formation on the basis of an association of citizens, while 
in Russia it arose ‘from above’ and, accordingly, cannot perform its intended 
functions. Youth organisations are institutions of civil society the purpose 
of which is to represent and lobby their interests before the authorities, 
but due to the specifics of the development and functioning of civil society 
in Russia, the authorities are not ready to hear them.
4. Conclusion
Summing up, the following conclusions can be drawn. First, the polit-
ical practices used by young people to defend their interests are marginal. 
Secondly, the most common and effective political practice of young people 
in the offline space is protest behaviour. Thirdly, the marginality of the polit-
ical practices of young people makes it difficult to predict and regulate them, 
which can lead to riots and destabilization of the situation in the state. Fourth-
ly, the excessive legalization of attitudes towards marginal practices leads 
to the opposite effect, escalating the marginality of young people. Because 
of this, the political practices of young people are marked by the authorities 
as negative and threatening, and therefore subject to forceful confrontation. 
Fifth, the most effective ways to overcome the negative consequences of pro-
391
test behaviour are social partnership and constructive dialogue between 
the authorities and youth.
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